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Abstract 
This paper deals with the question of the trade-offs between bio-fuels, fossil-fuels, and 
food. To do so an analysis is conducted taking into consideration the differences in relative 
prices and in the productive structure among the countries. The results shows that in general 
food puts a greater stress over the economies than energy does, and mainly in the developing 
economies. As a consequence of that, the possibilities for the growing use of bio-fuels is 
limited and restrict to countries where it is possible to have an expansion of bio-fuel 
production without compromising the production of food and without putting more stress 
over the environment. This, by its turn, restricts the possibilities for a world policy of bio-fuels 
with the consequence that bilateral agreements would be the dominant ones.  
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1. Is There a Possible Common Policy for Bio-fuels? 
 
The answer is no, because bio-fuel demand and supply is commanded by a set of 
country specific restrictions. Rising food cost is a very sensitive issue for low income 
countries, also in countries that have experienced famine due to social or political 
upheavals. Global energy crisis increases average cost of energy everywhere but 
uncertainty about energy supply has many different forms according to the availability 
of alternative primary sources and access to traded complementary sources. Global 
Warming awareness is becoming another constraint on fossil fuels and energy 
efficiency but widely different between countries. A further complication draws upon 
the fact that those three restrictions are not independent, for any change in one of them 
as for instance the rising cost of oil, the impact upon food supply is negative and many 
countries will make more use of coal as an alternative source for thermal electricity. 
The implications of biofuels production on emission of green house gases and 
the net effect of the substitution of fossil fuels cannot be underestimated. By the end of 
2007 German government issued a draft of the biomass sustainability ordinance, with 
the inclusion of a first assessment of land use changes following recommendations from 
the IPCC report. Given a certain set of default values and the assumption that sugar 
cane and soybean expansion in Latin America comes from conversion of savannah soils 
to cropland, and palm oil in Southeast Asia from rainforest, an amazing set of results 
depicted in Figure 1 below, contributed to a halt on fiscal incentives to bio-fuel 
production in Germany and imports without previous certification.  
Many other countries followed suit and to complicate matters further the bubble 
on food market prices created a dismal picture for bio-fuels. The two following sections 
deals with pricing bio-fuels as a substitute for fossil fuels and the wide dispersion 
between countries on the role of food and energy sectors suggesting that bilateral trade 
agreements is a better strategic alternative to Brazil than the current choice of a globally 
traded commodity. 
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Figure 1 - Green House Emissions by Alternative Bio-fuels 
 
 
 
 
2. Trade Opportunities 
 
In this section we address the issue of bio-fuels prospective trade opportunities 
or, in another way to put it, can bio-fuels become commodities regularly traded in spot 
and future markets? 
Fossil fuels although traded regularly have a substantial share traded under long 
term contracts to give enough security on the issue of access,  even though contracted 
price may fluctuate according to some formulae related to spot and future market 
references. The majority of fossil fuel reserves are state property or state controlled 
corporation’s property. Market uncertainty is not left to speculation by economic agents 
but handled as a national security affair consequently it is priced and supplied by a 
myriad of alternative structures in each nation. Average prices collected on an annual 
basis reflect this diversity as in Figure 2 below, domestic indirect taxation more than 
border tariff explains the dispersion between gasoline and diesel prices. 
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Figure 2 – WDI / Diesel & Gasoline Prices, 34 Countries. 
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This sample of 34 countries adds to 85% of the world consumption of energy. 
The lowest prices are found in typical oil exporting economies, for a $0,20 per gallon of 
diesel gasoline is priced at $ 0,28; in a middle group of countries (Brazil and USA 
included), for a diesel of $ 0,60 gasoline is at $ 0,76; for the group of high priced liquid 
fuels, diesel goes for $1,20 and gasoline for $1,44. This is not the kind of price 
dispersion that we expect from a level playing field type of market structure but is a real 
picture of a crystallized diverse set of national regulated markets.  
The current generation of biofuels consists of basic agricultural products 
subjected to well known transformation procedures, mostly fermentation and chemical 
reaction. It is essentially a joint production system of multiple products, that could be 
organized as a regular market system. Most used agricultural products- sugar cane, 
maize, wheat, soybean,….- have only been traded under a global market system since 
the Uruguay Round (1995), for fifty years after the II World War the spectrum of 
chronic starvation prevented most nations to abandon the objective of self sufficiency 
and protectionism. Against the uncertainty of agricultural production many countries 
have shown a preference for building stocks of basic food products and occasionally 
getting rid of their high cost of maintenance by exporting at subsidized prices. Food 
security was the main strategic goal; reluctantly many countries accepted the 
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uncertainties around market access in exchange for domestic inefficient production and 
failures in the pursuit of self sufficiency.  
Price dispersion among basic agricultural commodities is not as wide as with 
fossil fuels but still far away from normally traded manufactured products. Figures 3, 4 
and 5 show alternative ways for comparison. Excluding Japan, Korea and Nigeria (most 
protected agricultural markets) in a three fold range of prices we find 25 wheat 
producing countries (out of those 34 countries seen before), in a five fold range we 
include another 24 maize producing countries, and in a ten fold range we include 19 rice 
producing countries. Ten years after the Uruguay Round what we have is still a diverse 
set of national regulated markets 
   
Figure 3 - FAO/Maize&Rice Prices for 19 Countries 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – FAO / Maize & Wheat Prices, 25 Countries 
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Figure 5 – FAO / Rice & Wheat Prices, 24 Countries 
 
 
Recent market volatility is reminding us of how limited is food security under a 
free market framework. Global demand for food was raised to unprecedented level due 
to the dominant role played by emerging economies and global supply did not respond 
in order to keep inventories at a safe level; Figure 6 reports data on demand by group of 
countries, demand for corn by ethanol producers, and on global supply of major crops. 
 
Figure 6 - World Demand and Supply of Major Crops 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Inventories decreased for almost a decade, prices became more volatile since 
2002/2003 and extremely speculative in 2007/2008 when a few countries raised export 
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restrictions (Central Europe on wheat, and South Asian countries on rice), Figure 7 
below. One explanation points to a major fault in WTO regulation, because it lacks in 
safeguard clauses when global inventories are at extremely low levels, requiring from 
major suppliers’, government supported prices above international market prices in 
order to induce inventory accumulation. There is no built in incentive for individual 
countries to behave in a manner consistent with global common interest, they have to 
bare the costs of inventory build up and collect no benefit from doing it. 
 
Figure 7 -  End of the Year Inventories of Coarse Grains. 
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Bio-fuels are close substitutes to fossil-fuels as such subjected to specific 
national market structures. Mandatory blending requirements are common for biodiesel 
and ethanol, standards of energy efficiency and environment protection must be similar 
to fossil fuels. Pricing must also be consistent to the regulatory framework applied to 
fossil fuels, which differs widely between countries. Food security and agricultural price 
policy are part of an independent set of regulatory framework, both with a strong 
historical heritage. There is a lot of work to be done in order to make these two sets of 
regulations consistent within each country, much more so between countries.  
As an example from Germany, in July 2007, pump average price of diesel was 
US$ 1.62 per liter (at current exchange rate); assuming that the highest share for 
vegetable oil cost is 72% of pump price in order to warrant a good profit for industry 
and retailer, the highest price to be paid for soybean oil should be US$ 1.27 per kg. 
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(0.92 kg of vegetable oil for 1 liter of biodiesel). Soon after the northern hemisphere 
harvest, CBOT future price for soybean was just above the $1300 level. After March of 
2008, when most subsidies where abandoned in Europe, price began to fall 
dramatically. 
 
3. Food, Energy, Prices and Productive Structure 
 
 There is a close relation between the role that food and energy play in the 
productive structure of the countries and how the countries will react to policies related 
to fossil-fuel, bio-fuels and food. 
 To better analyze this relation we have select eight countries with different 
levels of development and which are important players in the world in terms of food and 
energy consumption and production. The selected countries are Argentina, Brazil, 
China, India, United States, France, Germany and Japan. 
 The basis for the analysis are the comparable Input-Output Matrices released by 
OECD (see OECD, 2006), and which refers to the year of 2000 for Brazil, China, USA, 
France, Germany and Japan, the year of 1997 for Argentina, and the year of 1998/99 for 
India.  
 Figure 8 shows the shares of total value of imports, food imports, and energy 
imports in the total value of production of the select countries, while Figure 9 shows the 
share of food and energy in total imports. From these figures it is possible to see that 
France and Germany are the more opened economies, with imports representing 
respectively 14.5% and 17.1% of their total output, while for the other economies the 
share of imports varies between 5.8% and 8.2%. As for food and energy imports, they 
represent a small share of the total value o production, between 0.4% and 1.2% for food 
and between 0.2% and 1.3% for energy. In all the other countries being analyzed, with 
the exception of Argentina, the share of energy imports are higher than the share of food 
imports, and in the cases of Brazil, India and USA energy has more than the double of 
importance of the food imports. 
 Figure 10 shows the role played by imports of food and energy in total 
disposable food and energy, while Figure 11 shows the share of imported inputs in the 
production of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel. When one gets inside 
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the countries it is possible to see that imported energy has a high share in the total 
disposable energy for the countries being considered than food has, with special 
importance for France (25.1%), Germany (25.6$), and Japan (18.3%), followed by India 
(14.0%) and USA (14.2%), an in a lesser scale China (7.2%), Brazil (10.9%) and 
Argentina (4.8%). However, it is possible to see the high dependence that France, 
Germany and Japan have on imported inputs for energy production, more than 98%, 
followed by India (55.4%), USA (50.9%), China (30.6%), Brazil (19.2%), and 
Argentina (7.7%). As for food consumption the higher dependence on imports is found 
in Germany (20.9%), France (16.2%), and Japan (10.6%), followed by USA (6.7%), 
while in the other countries the dependence is less than 4%. 
 In summary, from the analysis of Figures 8 to 11 it is possible to see that in 
terms of imports, energy is more important than food and that, with the exception of 
Brazil and Argentina, there is a high dependence of the other economies on imports of 
primary energy for secondary energy production. 
 
Figure 8 – Share of Imports in Total Output of Selected Developing and Developed Countries 
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Note: Argentina refers to 1997; Brazil, China, USA, France, Germany, and Japan to 2000; and India to 
1998/99. 
Source: Estimated from OECD (2006) 
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Figure 9 – Share of Food and Energy in Total Imports of Selected Developing and Developed 
Countries 
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Note: Argentina refers to 1997; Brazil, China, USA, France, Germany, and Japan to 2000; and India to 
1998/99. 
Source: Estimated from OECD (2006) 
 
 
Figure 10 – Share of Imported Food and Energy in Total Disposable Food and Energy of 
Selected Developing and Developed Countries 
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Note: Argentina refers to 1997; Brazil, China, USA, France, Germany, and Japan to 2000; and India to 
1998/99. 
Source: Estimated from OECD (2006) 
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Figure 11 – Share of Imported Inputs in the Total Value of Mining and Querying (energy) 
used in the Sector of Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel of Selected 
Developing and Developed Countries 
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Note: Argentina refers to 1997; Brazil, China, USA, France, Germany, and Japan to 2000; and India to 
1998/99. 
Source: Estimated from OECD (2006) 
 
Figures 12 to 14 show the importance of food and energy for production 
(intermediate consumption), final demand and in the total output of the economy. 
For the intermediate consumption, the economies being considered can be 
divided into two groups, the first one consisting of developing economies - Argentina, 
Brazil, China, and India – in which the added shares of food and energy into 
intermediate consumption are between 24% and 32%, and the developed economies – 
USA, France, Germany, and Japan – which the added share are between 12% and 14%, 
i.e., less than half of the shares observed for the developing economies. Inside each 
country, on general the shares observed for food are close to the ones observed for 
energy, with the exception of Argentina (food, 15.7%, and energy, 8.3%), USA (food, 
4.8%, and energy, 7.2%), and Japan (food, 5.8%, and energy, 7.6%). 
As for the final demand shares, energy in all of the economies being considered 
represent less than 3% of the final demand, however, for food, its share goes from 4.1% 
in the USA to 28.4% in India. In the developed economies being considered, the share 
of food is less than 8%, while for the developing economies it has a value of around 
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13% for Argentina and Brazil, going to 19.3% in China and 28.4% in India. This 
structure shows the importance of food in less developed economies, due to the 
structure of consumption of the low income classes where food has a greater relative 
importance than the other consumer goods. 
Overall, i.e., considering the total output in the economy, as show in Figure 14, 
the share of energy in total output in the developing economies (around 7.0%) is about 
double of the one found in developed economies (around 3.5%). As for food, Argentina, 
Brazil and China have a share of around 15% of the total output, while for India the 
share is of 25.1% and for the developed economies the share is between 4.4% for the 
USA and 7.4% for France. This again reinforce the results found above, showing the 
relative low importance of food and energy for the developed economies, in terms of 
value of production, when compared to its importance in less developed economies. 
 
Figure 12 – Share of Food and Energy in Intermediate Consumption of Selected Developing 
and Developed Countries 
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Note: Argentina refers to 1997; Brazil, China, USA, France, Germany, and Japan to 2000; and India to 
1998/99. 
Source: Estimated from OECD (2006) 
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Figure 13 – Share of Food and Energy in Final Demand of Selected Developing and Developed 
Countries 
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Note: Argentina refers to 1997; Brazil, China, USA, France, Germany, and Japan to 2000; and India to 
1998/99. 
Source: Estimated from OECD (2006) 
 
 
Figure 14 – Share of Food and Energy in Total Demand of Selected Developing and 
Developed Countries 
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Note: Argentina refers to 1997; Brazil, China, USA, France, Germany, and Japan to 2000; and India to 
1998/99. 
Source: Estimated from OECD (2006) 
 
This directly reflects on the disposable value added generated in the economies 
being considered here, Figure 15. While for China and India the combined importance 
of food and energy is respectively of 31.4% and 35.2%, for Brazil is 18.1%, for 
Argentina is 12.3%, and for the developed economies is less than 10%. With the 
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exception of the USA, in all the other countries food has a greater share in the economy 
than energy. 
As can be seen in Figure 16, the relation between food and energy in the 
generation of the disposable domestic value is 0,73 for the USA, around 1,50 for Brazil, 
France, Germany, and Japan, around 2,2 for Argentina and China, and of 5,1 for India. 
As a consequence of that, one can see that a policy of bio-fuels that would imply a 
substitution of food for energy, with the exception of the USA, will put more stress over 
the economies than a policy of price increase of energy and/or a policy of substitution of 
fossil-fuel energy from other sources than bio-fuels energy. 
 
Figure 15 – Share of Disposable Domestic Value Added of Food and Energy in GDP of 
Selected Developing and Developed Countries 
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Note: Argentina refers to 1997; Brazil, China, USA, France, Germany, and Japan to 2000; and India to 
1998/99. 
Source: Estimated from OECD (2006) 
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Figure 16 – Relation of Disposable Domestic Value Added Between Food and Energy of 
Selected Developing and Developed Countries 
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Note: Argentina refers to 1997; Brazil, China, USA, France, Germany, and Japan to 2000; and India to 
1998/99. 
Source: Estimated from OECD (2006) 
 
The relative importance of food and energy in the economies can also be 
estimated by measuring the price transmission effects of a price increase in the 
economy, as displayed in Figures 17 and 18 that show the impact of a 10% increase, 
respectively, of food and energy over the wholesale price index (WPI) and the consumer 
price index (CPI). The results show, as expected, that the increase of food price will 
have a greater impact over the CPI while the increase of energy price will have, with the 
exception of France and Germany, a greater impact over the WPI. Also, the impact on 
the CPI due to an increase of food price is greater than the one due to an increase of 
energy price, in all the countries being considered here. As for the impact of food and 
energy prices over the WPI, one has that for Argentina and India the impact of food 
prices are clearly greater than the impact of energy prices, while for the other countries 
being considered, there are only slight differences between the impact of food and 
energy prices. 
However, it must be stressed that impacts over the developing economies are 
greater than the ones in the developed ones. For food, while one has at most an impact 
of 1.56% in the WPI of France, for the developing countries it starts at 1.67% in the 
WPI of Argentina and goes up through 5.0% in the CPI of China. For an increase in the 
energy prices, the impact over Brazil, China and India are clearly greater than the one 
for Argentina, USA, France, Germany, and Japan. 
16 
 
 As a reflect of this, there is enough room for the developed countries being 
considered here, mainly France, Germany and Japan to practice polices of high prices 
on the energy with lower impact over the economy, as they are used to do. 
Special attention need to be paid to China, due to its size and important role in 
the world trade. From the above analysis it is clear the importance of cheap food and 
energy for the development of China and the adverse impacts that an increase in their 
prices will have over the Chinese economy, internally and in its competitivity in the 
international market. 
 
 
Figure 17 – Impact of a 10% Change on the Price of Food on the Wholesale Price Index (WPI) 
and on the Consumer Price Index of Selected Developing and Developed Countries 
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Note: Argentina refers to 1997; Brazil, China, USA, France, Germany, and Japan to 2000; and India to 
1998/99. 
Source: Estimated from OECD (2006) 
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Figure 18 – Impact of a 10% Change on the Price of Energy on the Wholesale Price Index 
(WPI) and on the Consumer Price Index of Selected Developing and Developed Countries 
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CPI 0.57 1.25 1.36 0.93 0.62 0.78 0.73 0.72 
Impact of a 10% Change on the Price of Energy on the
Wholesale Price Index (WPI) and on the Consumer Price Index (CPI
 
Note: Argentina refers to 1997; Brazil, China, USA, France, Germany, and Japan to 2000; and India to 
1998/99. 
Source: Estimated from OECD (2006) 
 
The above also implies that the substitution of fossil-fuel for bio-fuel will be 
only feasible in countries that have enough land to expand the bio-fuel production 
without compromising the production of food or putting more stress over the 
environment. In the Brazilian case, Figures 19 to 21 that display, respectively, the stress 
over the Brazilian territory of cattle, soybean, and sugar cane production in 1995 and 
2006, show that the cattle production is putting a stress over the Amazon forest, and the 
land left behind, due to its expansion, are being occupied by soybean production. On the 
other hand, the sugar cane production seems to have its own pattern of growth without 
putting much stress over the environment, and food production, in the period being 
considered. 
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Figure 19 – Cattle Production Stress over the Brazilian Territory – 1995 and 2006 
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Figure 20 – Soybean Production Stress over the Brazilian Territory – 1995 and 2006 
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Figure 21 – Sugar Cane Production Stress over the Brazilian Territory – 1995 and 2006 
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4. Concluding Remark 
 
The above analysis has show that in general food puts a greater stress over the 
economies than energy does, and mainly in the developing economies. As a 
consequence of that, the possibilities for the growing use of bio-fuels is limited and 
restrict to countries where it is possible to have an expansion of bio-fuel production 
without compromising the production of food and without putting more stress over the 
environment. This, by its turn, restricts the possibilities for a world policy of bio-fuels 
with the consequence that bilateral agreements would be the dominant ones. As so, an 
implication for a world policy would be to start the process of negotiation with bilateral 
agreements, than slowly evolving into regional trade, as it is a more realistic framework 
for a safe development of bio-fuels markets.  
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